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Abstract. In recent years, memory disclosure attacks, such as cold boot
attack and DMA attack, have posed huge threats to cryptographic ap-
plications in real world. In this paper, we present a CPU-bounded mem-
ory disclosure attacks resistant yet ecient software implementation of
elliptic curves cryptography on general purpose processors. Our imple-
mentation performs scalar multiplication using CPU registers only in
kernel level atomatically to prevent the secret key and intermediate data
from leaking into memory. Debug registers are used to hold the private
key, and kernel is patched to restrict access to debug registers. We take
full advantage of the AVX and CLMUL instruction sets to speed up the
implementation. When evaluating the proposed implementation on an
Intel i7-2600 processor (at a frequency of 3.4GHz), a full scalar multipli-
cation over binary elds for key length of 163 bits only requires 129 s,
which outperforms the unprotected implementation in the well known
OpenSSL library by a factor of 78.0%. Furthermore, our work is also
exible for typical Linux applications. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the rst practical ECC implementation which is resistant against
memory disclosure attacks so far.
Keywords: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Ecient Implementation, Mem-
ory Disclosure Attack, Cold Boot Attack, AVX, CLMUL
1 Introduction
Main memory has long been commonly used to store private keys at runtime for
various cryptosystems because of the assumption that memory space isolation
mechanism of operating system and volatility of dynamic RAM (DRAM) prevent
access from adversaries both logically and physically. However, the presence of
cold boot attack [5] shows acquiring memory contents is much easier than most
people thought. Cold boot attack leverages the data remanence property which
is a fundamental physical property of DRAM chips, because of which DRAM
contents take a signicant time to fade away gradually. This property exists in
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all DRAM chips and it determines how DRAM chips works: holding memory
contents by refreshing the state of each memory unit periodly. The problem is
that the time before memory contents fading away after the moment at which
memory chips lost power can be signicant extended at a low temperature, and
memory contents stop fading away and become readable again once memory
chips power on, so memory contents may survive across boots. As a result, for
a running target machine physically accessible to adversaries, adversaries are
able to transplant the memory chips from the machine to a well prepared attack
machine after cooling down the memory chips, and cold boot the attack machine
with a customized boot loader to bypass all defence mechanisms of the target
machine and dump the memory contents to some persistent storage to get a
snapshot of the memory contents.
Cold boot attack is not the only attack can be used to acquire the mem-
ory contents. DMA attack is another powerful attack which uses direct memory
access through ports like Firewire, IEEE1394 to access physical memory space
of the target machine. And the recently exposed vulnerable of OpenSSL called
\HeartBleed"5 which leaks memory contents onto network can also be used for
memory acquisition. These attacks are called memory disclosure attacks in
general, since they disclose contents in memory partially or entirely to adver-
saries while adversaries are unable to actively change the contents in the memory.
Not only PCs and laptops, smart phones have also been demonstrated to be vul-
nerable to these attacks[13]. These attacks pose huge and prevalent threats to
the implementation of both public-key and symmetric-key cryptosystems which
hold secret keys in memory at runtime, and adversaries are able to reconstruct
the key eciently when only a part of the key or key schedule is acquired[5,7].
Compared to symmetric-key cryptosystems, these attacks may cause more dam-
age on public-key cryptosystems, since revoking a compromised private key is
very expensive, sometimes even impossible: private keys often have a long life
cycle such as several years, leakage of high sensitive private keys leads to serious
consequences.
Memory disclosure attacks have become a research hotspot since the presence
of cold boot attack[5]. Akavia et al. proposed a new security model to formally
describe memory disclosure attacks[1], in which the total amount of key leakage
is bounded while \only computation leaks information" in traditional model of
side channel attacks. Based on this model, several schemes have been proposed
to resist memory disclosure attacks theoretically[1] [2] [15]. These solutions are
not practical and cannot be used to protect existing cryptographic primitives,
such as AES, RSA, etc.
Several solutions based on CPU-bounded encryption have been proposed to
protect existing cryptographic primitives. The underlying idea of which is to
avoid DRAM usage completely by storing the secret key and sensitive inner
state in CPU registers, since there has been no known attacks can be used to
acquire contents of CPU registers. AESSE [11] from Muller et al. implemented
an AES cryptosystem using X86 SSE registers as the key storage. The perfor-
5 http://heartbleed.com
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mance of AESSE is about 6 times slower than a standard implementation. As
a successor of AESSE, TRESOR [12] utilizes the new X86 AES-NI instructions
for AES encryption to provide a better performance and a better compatibility
with Linux distributions. Loop-Amnesia [16] stores a master key inside Machine
Specic Registers (MSRs), and supports multiple AES keys securely inside RAM
by scrambling them with the master key. TreVisor [14] builds TRESOR into the
hypervisor layer to yield an OS-independent disk encryption solution.
On the other hand, resisting memory disclosure attacks for public key cryp-
tosystem is more challenging. Garmany et al.[4] have proposed a memory disclo-
sure attacks resistant RSA implementation based on CPU-bounded encryption.
They achieved 21 ms per operation for modular exponentiation, which is about
ten times slower than o-the-shelf cryptographic libraries. And the TLS server
based on their implementation achieved a signicant higher latency under high
load in the benchmark.
An important reason for the unsatised performance in PRIME is the ex-
treme large key size of RSA for CPU registers. On the other hand, elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC)[10][8] provides the same level of security as RSA with a
much smaller key size, and thus, requires less memory storage. In this case, ef-
cient implementation of ECC which resists against memory disclosure attacks
is still a challenging work. Our work presented in this paper is going to make up
for the gap.
1.1 Contributions
In this paper, we propose an ecient elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) imple-
mentation that also resists memory disclosure attacks by keeping the private
key and sensitive intermediate state out of the memory. In detail, our major
contributions are listed as follows:
{ We proposed an ecient and memory disclosure attack resistant CPU-bounded
elliptic curve cryptography cryptosystem using new features on modern X86-
64 CPUs. The cryptosystem keeps the private key and sensitive intermediate
data within CPU registers after the private key is loaded so that attackers
have no chance to retrieve the key or key schedule from the memory.
{ The cryptosystem makes full use of AVX and CLMUL instruction sets of
X86-64 CPU architecture to speed up the computation. The performance
evaluation of our solution on an Intel i7-2600 processor found our implemen-
tation achieves a performance of 129 s for a scalar multiplication operation
over binary elds for key length of 163 bits. This result outperforms the
unprotected fashion of OpenSSL by a factor of 78.0%.
{ To the best of our knowledge, this work provides the rst memory disclo-
sure attacks resistant ECC implementation, and the rst public-key cryp-
tographic implementation that resists these attacks, and provides a better
performance than o-the-shelf cryptographic libraries at the same time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. A brief introduction of elliptic
curve cryptography is given in section 2 together with architecture we focus on.
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Next we describe how we design and implement the solution in section 3. Then
the evaluation on security and performance is given in section 4. Finally, we
conclude this paper in section 5.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we rst recap the basic knowledge of elliptic curve cryptography
and then give a brief description of the CPU architecture and key instruction
sets we used for our implementation.
2.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) can be considered as an approach of public-
key cryptography based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over nite
elds[10][8]. An elliptic curve over a eld K is dened by Equation 1.
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6 (1)
The equation can be simplied for the characteristic of K is 2, 3, or greater than
3, respectively. The points satisfying the equation and a distinguished point at
innity which is the identity element forms a set, together with group operations
of the elliptic group theory form an Abelian group. The group is used in the
construction of elliptic curve cryptographic system.
There are two basic group operations in ECC: a point addition adds two dif-
ferent points together and a point doubling operation doubles a single point.
Point addition and point doubling are computed according to a chord-and-
tangent rule. Scalar multiplication computes k  P where k is a scalar and P
is a point on an elliptic curve, that is adding P together k times. A scalar mul-
tiplication is computed as a serious of point additions and point doublings. Like
the integer exponentiation in RSA cryptosystem, scalar multiplication is the
basic cryptographic operation of various ECC schemes.
Domain parameters dene the eld and the curve of an ECC system, in-
cluding the eld order f , the curve constants a and b, the base point(subgroup
generator) G, the order of the base point n and the cofactor h. The generation
of domain parameters is time consuming, therefore several standard bodies pub-
lished domain parameters for several common eld sizes, which are commonly
known as \standard curves" or \named curves". Domain parameters must be
agreed on by all parties before use.
Each party must also generate a public-private key pair before use. The
private key d is a randomly selected scalar. The public key Q is computed as
Q = d G, where G is the base point. The security of an ECC cryptosystem relies
on the assumption that nding the discrete logarithm of a random elliptic curve
point with respect to a public known base point is infeasible.
Elliptic Curve Die-Hellman(ECDH) is an anonymous key agreement proto-
col that allows two parties to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel.
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It is a variant of the Die-Hellman protocol using elliptic curve cryptography.
Denote two parties A and B, the key pairs of them are (dA; QA) and (dB ; QB),
then they can compute dAQB and dBQA respectively to get a shared secret, as
(xk; yk) = dAQB = dAdBG = dBQA where xk is the shared secret. A symmetric
key can be derived from the shared secret to encrypt subsequent communica-
tions. The key exchange protocol is one of the most important applications for
public key cryptography.
2.2 The x86-64 CPU Architecture
x86-64 is the 64-bit version of x86 instruction set. It supports larger memory
address space and register les. X86-64 is supported by mainstream operating
systems and widely used in modern desktop and laptop computers. Besides the
base instruction set, we mainly use its two extensions: CLMUL and AVX.
Carry-Less Multiplication The Carry-Less Multiplication(CLMUL)6 instruc-
tion set is an X86 extension that can be used to compute a polynomial multiplica-
tion, which is the product of two operands without the generation or propagation
of carry values. Carry-less multiplication is an essential processing component
of several cryptographic systems and standards, including of the Galois Counter
Mode(GCM) and elliptic curve cryptography over binary elds. Software im-
plementations of carry-less multiplication are often inecient and suer from
potential side channel attacks, while CLMUL instruction set provides an conve-
nient and ecient way to calculate carry-less multiplications.
Advanced Vector Extensions The Advanced Vector Extensions (AVX/AVX2
/AVX{512) 7 are X86 SIMD extensions proposed by Intel. AVX and AVX2 are
supported by recent processors, while AVX{512 will be supported in 2015. AVX/
AVX2 doubles the amount of SIMD registers from 8 to 16, which are named as
YMM0{YMM15 respectively, and extends the width of each register from 128
bits to 256 bits. AVX{512 doubles the amount and width of SIM registers again
to 32 and 512 bits resprectively. AVX introduces a non-destructive three-operand
SIMD instruction format. Mixed usage of AVX and legacy SSE instructions
should be avoided to prevent AVX-SSE transition penalties. For any legacy SSE
instruction, there is an equivalent VEX encoded instruction which should be
used instead to avoid the penalty.
3 System Design and Implementation
3.1 System Overview
We hold the private key and intermediate data in CPU registers to avoid the
leakage of secret data. We implement the ECC scalar multiplication using as-
sembly language to control the usage of registers precisely to ensure no secret
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CLMUL_instruction_set
7 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Vector_Extensions
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data leaks into memory explicitly. To avoid the implicit leakage of secret data by
context switch mechanism, we deploy the ECC implementation in kernel level in
a loadable kernel module(LKM) and make the computation atomically by dis-
abling the interruption and kernel preemption during the computation. Netlink
based interfaces are provided for user level applications. We also implement an
OpenSSL engine to provide an interface based on our implementation for ECDH
operations to demonstrate the possibility of integrating our implementation with
existed applications. A private key is imported into the cryptosystem before use.
The imported key is stored in debug registers and loaded into YMM registers
before each scalar multiplication. The kernel of the operating system is patched
to restrict access to debug registers. The architecture of the system is shown in
Figure 1.
Kernel(Patched) ECC Module
ECC API(Netlink Based)
OpenSSL Engine
User Applications
X86-64 Hardware Platform
Kernel
Space
User
Space
GNU
Linux
ECDH
Import key
Point multiplication
Netlink
Point multiplication
Debug
Registers
Fig. 1. The architecture of the proposed ECC cryptosystem.
3.2 Implementation of Secure Scalar Multiplication in ECC
Field Operations For domain parameters \sect163k1", there are two sizes of
polynomial involved in eld operations: 163-bit and 325-bit. The former is the
size of polynomials over the eld F2163 , while the latter is the size of the product
of two polynomial and will be further reduced to 163 bits. As we implement
eld operations mainly with AVX instructions and YMM registers, we use one
YMM register for a 163-bit polynomial and two YMM registers for a 325-bit
polynomial.
Operations over binary eld are carry-less operations, which means the oper-
ation is performed without the generation or propagation of any carry values. In
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this case, for any polynomial a and b over the binary eld, the following equation
holds:
a+ b = a  b = a b
Namely that an addition and a subtraction over binary eld can be simply
calculated by XORing two operands.
The presence of CLMUL instruction set makes it much easier to imple-
ment carry-less multiplication eciently and securely. Denote the 163-bit input
operands A and B by [A2 : A1 : A0] and [B2 : B1 : B0], where Ai; Bj ; 0  i; j  2
is a 64-bit quad-word. The carry-less multiplication between Ai and Bj can be
simply calculated with a VPCLMULQDQ instruction:
Cij = Ai Bj = VPCLMULQDQ(Ai; Bj); 0  i; j  2
Then the product C of A and B can be calculated as:
C = A B = [C22 : C21  C12 : C20  C11  C02 : C10  C01 : C00]
Therefore we can implement a carry-less multiplication of two 163-bit operands
with only 9 PCLMULQDQ instructions for partial products, 4 bitwise XOR
instructions to combine partial products together, and several register manip-
ulation instructions to put the partial products into right place in the result.
A squaring operation can be implemented similarly as multiplicate the operand
with itself.
The result of a multiplication or a squaring is a 325-bit polynomial, therefore
it has to be reduced to 163 bits before further use. We use the NIST fast reduction
algorithm and modulo f(z) = z163 + z7 + z6 + z3 + z1 dened in FIPS 186-2[3]
for reduction.
The inversion operation is to nd a polynomial g = a 1modf over F2m for the
polynomial a satisfying ag  1(modf). The inverse can be eciently calculated
by the extended Euclidean algorithm for polynomials. In our solution, we use the
\modied almost inverse algorithm for inversion in F2m" algorithm[6] to calculate
the inversion of a polynomial in F2163 . An inversion operation takes much longer
time than other basic eld operations, therefore the group operation algorithm
must be carefully selected to reduce the number of inversion operations.
Group Operations We employ Montgomery ladder for elliptic curves over
binary elds to compute a scalar multiplication [9]. One advantage of this algo-
rithm is that it does not have any extra storage requirements, which is suitable
for our CPU-bounded ECC cryptosystem since the storage space we can use is
limited. It is also ecient enough and has been used in mainstream cryptographic
libraries, such as OpenSSL. We use the projective version of the algorithm in
order to reduce eld inversions, as described by Lopez and Dahab[9].
In this algorithm, each iteration j between line 4{13 performs an addition
(line 7 and 10) and a doubling (line 8 and 11) to compute the x-coordinates
only of Tj = [lp; (l + 1)p], where l is the integer represented by the jth left
most bit of k. After the nal iteration, x-coordinates of kP and (k + 1)P have
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been computed, and line 14 and 15 are used to compute the ane coordinates
of kP . Using temporary variables for intermediate result, one addition requires
4 eld multiplications and one squaring, and one doubling requires 2 eld mul-
tiplications and 4 squarings. The number of temporary variables used by an
addition and a doubling is 2 and 1 respectively. The operation used to convert
kP and (k + 1)P back to ane coordinates requires 3 temporary variables, 10
eld multiplications, 1 eld squaring and 1 eld inversion.
We allocate the YMM registers as follows. One YMM register for storing a
dimension of a point on elliptic curve over F2163 , and thus, two YMM registers
are sucient for a point represented in ane coordinates. Following the equa-
tions listed above, we implement addition and doubling with eld operation in
MACROs. Consequently, a doubling operation requires ve YMM registers and
an addition requires eight YMM registers, as well as the scalar multiplication
algorithm (i.e. doubling-and-addition) requires 12 YMM registers. At the end,
the ECC private key is a polynomial over the eld and can be stored into one
YMM register.
3.3 Deployment of ECC Cryptosystem in the Operating System
The implementation of ECC scalar multiplication should be carefully deployed
in the operating system to make it be secure and accessible to user space appli-
cations. As described above, we implement the ECC cryptosystem as a loadable
kernel module(LKM) to make it run atomically and patched the kernel to protect
the private key. We demonstrate the modication and deployment successfully
on Ubuntu 14.04, the kernel version is 3.13.0-34.
Atomicity The private key and sensitive intermediate data is kept in YMM
registers during cryptographic computations, so we have to make the computa-
tion atomic to prevent sensitive intermediate data being swapped into the mem-
ory. This can be achieved by disabling the interruption and the kernel preemp-
tion by preempt_disable(), local_irq_save() and local_irq_disable() be-
fore the computation, and enable the interruption and the kernel preemption
again after the computation by local_irq_enable(), local_irq_restore()
and preempt_enable() to make the system run normally.
User Space Interface We provide two interfaces based on netlink mechanism,
which is widely used for communications between kernel and user space processes
of the same host:
private key import Import the private key into the debug registers. The input
is the plain text of the private key, which is a 163-bit big number.
private key operation Calculate the product of the point multiplication be-
tween the private key and a given point. The input is a point which is
represented by two big numbers.
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Each interface is implemented as a request-response round trip, namely the user
space process send the request consisting of the function name and input values
into the kernel then block until a response is received.
Private Key Protection Access to debug registers should be prevented from
either user space or kernel space other than the code of our system to prevent key
damage and loss of secret data. Debug registers can only be accessed with ring
0 privilege directly. Access to debug registers in user space and kernel space are -
nally delegated to kernel functions ptrace_set_debugreg, ptrace_get_debugreg,
native_set_debugreg and native_get_debugreg. We modied these functions
to discard any change to debug registers and inform the caller there is no debug
registers available. We searched the source of the kernel we are using thoroughly
and found no other accesses to debug registers besides in these functions, which
means only our module has access to debug registers in our patched system in
both user space and kernel space.
Debug registers are per-core registers, therefore we have to copy the key
into debug registers on all CPUs to prevent logical errors. We implement this
procedure with the help of the kernel function smp_call_function which runs
a certain function on all other CPUs.
4 Evaluation and Discussion
4.1 Security Verication
We assume the procedure of loading the key from a secure storage to the registers
is safe and the memory trace of the key is erased immediately. This assumption
is reasonable, because this procedure is transient and the user of the system
has to physically access the computer to load the key, which also prevent the
physical access from attackers. Therefore our system focus on the life cycle since
the private key has been loaded into the registers.
We implement ECC in a way that no private key or sensitive intermediate
data leaks into memory once the private key has been loaded into debug registers.
Considering about the threats posed by memory disclosure attacks, our approach
resists these attacks since adversaries cannot get the private key or any private
key related data which can be used for key recovery with these attacks from our
cryptosystem. In this section, we analyze and evaluate the approach to verify its
security under the threats of these attacks.
Since we have already patched kernel functions which are used to access
debug registers, and Muller et al. have veried debug registers are reset to zero
after both cold and warm reboot, there is no way for the key to be moved into
memory from debug registers or be accessed with cold boot attack.
For intermediate data and the private key in YMM registers, they will not
appear in memory unless we write them to memory explicitly or be swapped
into memory due to interruptions during the execution. We reviewed our code
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Table 1. Performance comparison of scalar multiplication between OpenSSL and this
work. ?: unprotected version. y: protected version
Implementation Operations Per Second
OpenSSL 4346?
This work 7734y
Improvements 78.0%
thoroughly and made sure only the nal result is written into memory. As pre-
emption and interruption are disabled during the computation, our system is
theoretically not vulnerable to memory disclosure attacks.
We also veried the correctness of the system on the test machine. Since we
have already known the private key, we do this by acquire a series of snapshots
of the memory contents after the key is loaded and search for the private key
in them. If our system works correctly, there will be no match in snapshots.
Performing a memory disclosure attack such as cold boot attack actually is time
consuming, and these attacks get no more than memory contents, so we used
a tool called fmem 8 to acquire the whole range of memory contents instead.
We also performed this test on a system running a process using OpenSSL ECC
library with the same private key as a comparison. The result shows there is
a match of the private key on the system using OpenSSL while there is no
signicant match on the system using our approach.
As should be noted that the security of cryptographic application in real
world is not trivial, single countermeasure can not mitigate dierent attacks.
But our method is compatible with other countermeasures such as software based
power analysis defeat method and can be used together.
4.2 Performance
Our benchmark is running on a desktop with an Intel Core i7-2600 proces-
sor set to be constantly running at 3.4 GHz. The operating system is Ubuntu
Linux 13.10 64-bit with our modied kernel at version 3.11.0. We implemented
an OpenSSL ECDH engine using scalar multiplication in our approach, and
compared the performance of ECDH operation on curve SECT163K1 in our im-
plementation with the same operation provided by OpenSSL9 at version 1.0.1e.
The evaluation shows the performance improvements precisely and practically,
since ECDH is widely used and each operation comprises mainly a single scalar
multiplication. The performance is measured by operations per second with the
OpenSSL built-in speed tool. the result is shown in Table 1.
As shown in the table, an ECDH operation, namely a scalar multiplication
in our solution is faster than that in OpenSSL by a factor of 78.0%. The result
of performance evaluation is encouraging, since our implementation is memory
disclosure attacks resistant and that in OpenSSL is not, ours is also much more
8 http://hysteria.sk/~niekt0/fmem/
9 https://www.openssl.org/
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Table 2. Performance comparison of eld arithmetic operations between OpenSSL
and this work (in s per operation)
Implementation Modular Add. Modular Mul. Modular Sqr. Inversion
OpenSSL 0.013 0.160 0.117 3.670
This work 0.004 0.084 0.083 3.133
Improvements 225% 90.1% 41.0% 17.1%
ecient. We also compared the performance of running scalar multiplications
directly and running with the APIs exposed into user space, and found com-
munications between user space and kernel brings 2%{5% overheads, which are
acceptable.
We also compared the performance improvements of each eld operations,
the result is shown in Table 2. The performance of eld addition, modular multi-
plication and modular squaring in our solution is faster than that in OpenSSL by
a factor of 225%, 90.1% and 41.0% respectively. The performance of inversion in
our solution is faster than that in OpenSSL by a factor of 17%. The performance
improvements due to the reduction of branches, unrolled loops and the power of
CLMUL and AVX instruction sets, etc.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
Memory disclosure attacks such as cold boot attack have become a threat that
must be considered by designers and developers of cryptographic libraries and
applications. To mitigate such threats, we present a systematic solution on pro-
tecting public key cryptography based on the idea that restricts the private key
and the intermediate states during the cryptographic operations inside CPU.
Our solution is implemented as a Linux kernel patch with interfaces in the user
space to provide secure elliptic curve scalar multiplications, and various secure
ECC schemes can be constructed based on it. Evaluation shows our approach
leaks none of the information that can be exploited by attackers to the memory,
therefore it resists the cold boot attack and other memory disclosure attacks
eectively. An ECC scalar multiplication over binary elds for key length of 163
bits in our solution is about 78.0% faster than that in OpenSSL. To the best
of our knowledge, our solution is the rst ecient ECC implementation that is
memory disclosure attacks resistant.
One of our future work is to support multiple private keys in our cryptosystem
so that it supports multiple applications at the same time. After the release of
processors supporting AVX-512, we will provide support of larger key size since
AVX-512 has 4 times more register space than AVX/AVX2.
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